“How psychology impacts the economy” plus 1 more |
How psychology impacts the economy Posted: 13 Jun 2010 03:05 PM PDT By ROSS GITTINS - The AgeJohn Maynard Keynes first recognised it when seeking to explain why the Great Depression happened even though the economic theory of the time said it couldn't. But it has taken the global financial crisis to help us rediscover that truth: the main reason economies fluctuate as they do is the changing psychology of the people who compose the economy. Keynes called this our ''animal spirits'', which is the title of a book by George Akerlof, a Nobel laureate in economics, and Robert Shiller, a leading proponent of behavioural finance.
These days, the term animal spirits is usually used to refer to business and consumer ''confidence'', as measured by, for example, the Westpac-Melbourne Institute index of consumer sentiment and the NAB survey of business confidence. But Akerlof and Shiller point out that ''animal'' means ''of the mind'' or ''animating''. So they take the term to refer to all our non-economic, non-rational emotions and motivations. Their point is that although these motivations have been defined as non-economic (and thus have been excluded from the conventional, neo-classical model of the economy), that doesn't stop them having a considerable influence over our economic behaviour. The truth is that the neo-classical model can't explain why market economies have always moved in boom-bust cycles. It simply assumes the economy is always at full employment. But the changing moods and attitudes of the humans who make up the economy can explain the business cycle. Akerlof and Shiller acknowledge confidence as the cornerstone of animal spirits, but argue they have four other components: fairness, corruption and bad faith, money illusion and stories. These other elements are needed to explain adequately the economy's ups and downs, and catastrophic events such as the global financial crisis. Conventional economics assumes that when businesses or individuals make significant investment decisions, they consider all the options available and all the possible monetary outcomes; they attach probabilities to each outcome, multiply the two together and then add them up to get the ''expected benefit''. If it's high enough they go ahead with the project. But often the probabilities are no more than educated guesses. So whether the project goes ahead often depends on how confident people feel about the prospects for the economy and their project, whether they're in an optimistic or pessimistic mood. Concerns about fairness are excluded from the conventional model, but not from the motivations of economic actors. Sociologists tell us there are behavioural ''norms'' that describe how people think they and others should behave in particular circumstances. We get angry when people fail to conform to norms and this anger may have adverse consequences for businesses. One area where perceptions of fairness are very much to the fore is in the setting of wages. Workers get angry when there's any suggestion of their wages being cut (even though they may well accept a fall in their real wages if economic conditions seem to warrant it). Employers' inability to cut nominal wages when there's a fall in the demand for their product means downturns in the economy lead to more unemployment than they would if wages and prices were more flexible (as the model assumes). Most recessions involve corporate corruption scandals and instances of ''bad faith'' (people behaving in ways that are unethical but not illegal). The business cycle is connected to fluctuations in personal commitment to principles of good behaviour and to fluctuations in predatory activity, which in turn is related to changes in opportunities for such activity. ''Money illusion'' means people base their economic decisions on ''nominal'' monetary amounts, failing to allow for the effect of inflation. But one of the most important assumptions of modern economics (where ''modern'' means it has reverted to the neo-classical assumptions that prevailed before the Keynesian revolution) is that people always see through the ''veil'' of inflation and compare prices in real terms. The obvious truth is that sometimes people allow for inflation and sometimes they don't. Or, they do to an extent, but not completely. If so, this causes them to behave in ways contrary to those predicted by the conventional model. The mind is built to think in terms of narratives, of sequences of events with an internal logic and dynamic that appear as a unified whole. And much human motivation comes from living through a story of our lives that we tell ourselves. The same is true for confidence in a nation, a company or an institution. Great leaders are first and foremost creators of stories. High confidence tends to be associated with inspirational stories, stories about new business initiatives, tales of how others are getting rich. ''New era'' stories (such as that the internet has brought us to a new era of profit and prosperity) have tended to accompany major booms in sharemarkets. So ends Akerlof and Shiller's list of all the main ''non-economic'' things that are in our minds and that influence our economic behaviour, but aren't in the conventional model. Capitalism isn't really in crisis, they conclude, it must merely live within certain rules and governments must set those rules. Sponsored linksFive Filters featured article: Headshot - Propaganda, State Religion and the Attack On the Gaza Peace Flotilla. Available tools: PDF Newspaper, Full Text RSS, Term Extraction. |
Perceptions can poison economic recovery Posted: 13 Jun 2010 12:15 AM PDT It's psychology, stupid. Not since World War II has an economic recovery been so hobbled by poor confidence. Every recession leaves a legacy of anxiety and uncertainty. But the present residue is exceptional because the recession was savage and its origins were unfamiliar. People are super-sensitive to the latest news, for good or ill, because their vision of the future is blurred, and their bias is gloomy. Having underrated economic risk during the boom, Americans may be overrating it now. Unfortunately, perceptions can become self-fulfilling. The Obama administration is grappling uneasily with this reality. It can rightly claim that its economic policies quelled the near-hysteria of late 2008 and early 2009. But the success was partial, and the administration isn't getting much credit even for that. The weak labor market is a powerful psychological poison. Almost everyone knows someone who is or was unemployed. True, the unemployment rate (9.7 percent in May) is below the post-World War II high (10.8 percent in late 1982), but underemployment and prolonged joblessness hover near postwar peaks. Almost half of the 15 million unemployed have been jobless six months or more. The stock market also shapes psychology. "Our economy has become very sensitive to the stock market," says Mark Zandi of Moody's Economy.com. The wealthiest 20 percent of Americans represent about 60 percent of consumer spending, says Zandi. These same people are most heavily invested in the market. When the market rises, they feel wealthier, save less and spend more — and vice versa. In mid-2007, their savings rate plunged to 1 percent of disposable income; but when the market dropped, savings jumped to 16 percent and spending suffered. The market's rebound beginning in March 2009 prompted another reversal. Feeling richer, the well-off spent more. By year-end 2009, their savings rate had dropped to 3.5 percent. Similarly, the market's latest decline could weaken the recovery. The danger is that pessimism feeds on itself and leads to a dreaded "double-dip" recession. Companies won't hire because they fear customers won't spend; and customers don't spend because they fear companies won't hire — or may fire. For the moment, a double-dip seems a long shot. Economists aren't especially adept at relating popular moods to economic outcomes; that's one reason why most missed the housing bubble and why today's forecasts seem tentative. It's also a further cause of depleted optimism. People have lost faith in economic seers, who often miss the latest turn in local or global developments. Was the present euro crisis widely predicted? Nope. Given the magnitude of the housing and financial carnage, most of today's cautiousness and risk aversion were unavoidable. But the Obama administration's anti-business rhetoric and controversial health "reform" may have compounded the effect. These policies created uncertainties and fanned partisan rancor. In the case of health "reform," they raised the cost of future full-time employees. The administration believes these various policies don't hamper economic recovery. It ignores contradictions and inconsistencies. Historians, more detached and better informed, may conclude otherwise. Five Filters featured article: Headshot - Propaganda, State Religion and the Attack On the Gaza Peace Flotilla. Available tools: PDF Newspaper, Full Text RSS, Term Extraction. |
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